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WRIGHT, DAVID HALL LIVING-
STON, an infant, by Ella Ivory 
Livingston, his guardian ad litem, 
Appellants, 
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ROBERTSON, Administrator of the 
Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased 
and ELLEN COOK, 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LaY AR W. THATCHER, Administrator 
of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, 
deceased, ELLA IVORY LIVING-
STON, GENIEL L. THATCHER, 
RUBY LIVINGSTON, an incompet-
ent, by Ella Ivory Livingston, her 
guardian ad litem, LESLIE L. 
WRIGHT, DAVID HALL LIVING-
STON, an infant, by Ella Ivory 
Livingston, his guardian ad litem, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
ISABELLE MERRIAM, EDWIN N. 
ROBERTSON, Administrator of the 
Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased 
and ELLEN COOK, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
7689 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents do not controvert any material parts 
appellants' statement of facts. But since the parties are in 
disagreement as to the legal effect of the written assign-
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ment, the circumstances under which it was executed are 
material to a proper understanding of that controversy. 
The assignment (Exhibit A), the vital portions of 
which are not set forth in appellants' statement, read as 
follows: 
"ASSIGNMENT 
"In consideration of the love and affection which 
I hold for the assignees herein, I, Joseph F. Living-
ston, of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, hereby give and assign fifty (50%) per 
cent of the following described property to my sister, 
Isabelle Mirriam, of Manti, Utah, twenty-five (25%) 
per cent of the following described property to my 
sister, Lillian Robertson, of Fountain Green, Utah, 
and twenty-five (25%) per cent of the following 
described property to my sister, Ellen Cook, of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, subject to the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth, said property being more par-
ticularly described as follows: 
"One Deed of Trust, covering 5,260 acres 
of real property situate in Rio Blanco and Mof-
fat Counties, State of Colorado, recorded in 
Book 100, Page 311 of Deeds of Trust, County 
Recorder's Office of Rio Blanco County, State 
of Colorado, and recorded in Book ... , Page ... 
of Deeds of Trust, County Recorder's Office of 
Moffat County, State of Colorado, in which in-
strument one Loren Dewayne Mirriam conveyed 
said property in trust to the undersigned, Joseph 
F. Livingston, to secure the payment of his 
promissory note made payable to the under-
signed, upon which there was a balance due as 
of November 1st, 1947, of the sum of $70,476.92, 
me1 
I~( 
lo: 
of 
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which promissory note said Deed of Trust 
secures. 
together with said promissory note, which the un-
dersigned hereby assigns to the assignees herein in 
the percentages herein reserved unto them, provided, 
however, that the undersigned assignor hereby re-
serves unto himself during his lifetime all amounts 
becoming due on the principal of said promissory 
note and all amounts in excess of the amounts 
periodically becoming due thereon which the maker 
thereof under the terms of said note may choose to 
pay on said principal during the lifetime of the as-
signor herein; the interest on said principal amount 
to be paid as said interest shall accrue, to the as-
signees herein in the percentages hereinabove re-
served, i.e., 50% of said interest accruing to be paid 
to said Isabelle Mirrian1, 25o/c of said interest accru-
ing to be paid to said Lillian Robertson, and 25% 
of said interest accruing to be paid to said Ellen 
Cook, the undersigned hereby authorizing the maker 
of said note and mortgage to make payment of the 
amounts herein assigned to the persons named in the 
percentages herein mentioned; and 
"The undersigned, for the considerations herein 
mentioned, hereby further gives and assigns fifty 
(50%) per cent of the following described property 
to said Isabelle Mirriam, twenty-five (25%) per cent 
of the following described property to said Lillian 
Robertson, and twenty-five (25%) per cent of the 
following described property to said Ellen Cook, 
subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set 
forth, said property being more particularly describ-
ed as follows : 
"One Chattel Mortgage on 3,100 head of 
ewes and 65 breeding rams, belonging to said 
Loren Dewayne Mirriam, grazing in the State 
of Colorado, which said chattel mortgage was 
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given to secure the note hereinabove mentioned, 
and which was recorded in the office of the 
County Recorder of Rio Blanco County, State 
of Colorado, in Book Filed No. 70064, Page ... 
of Chattel Mortgages, and which was recorded 
in the office of the County Recorder of Moffat 
County, State of Colorado, in Book ... , Page 
of Chattel Mortgages, 
the assignment of said chattel mortgage and the note 
securing the same, which is hereby made by the 
undersigned, being subject to the same terms and 
conditions as hereinabove set forth, to-wit: reserving 
unto the assignor herein during his lifetime all 
amounts becoming due on the principal of said note 
and all amounts in excess of the amounts periodically 
becoming due thereon which the maker thereof under 
the terms of said note may choose to pay on said 
principal during the lifetime of the assignor herein, 
the interest on said principal amount to be paid as 
said interest shall accrue, to the assignees herein in 
the percentages hereinabove reserved, i.e., 50% of 
said interest accruing to be paid to said Isabelle 
Mirriam, 25% of said interest accruing to be paid 
to said Lillian Robertson, and 25% of said interest 
accruing to be paid to said Ellen Cook, the under-
signed hereby authorizing the maker of said note 
and chattel mortgage to make payment of the 
amounts herein assigned to the persons named in 
the percentages hereinabove mentioned. 
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 27th day of 
March, 1948. 
"Is/ Joseph F. Livingston 
"Signed in the Presence of: 
"Is/ A. H. Anderson 
"M 
"M 
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"STATE OF UTAH } 
"COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ss 
"Personally appeared before me, a Notary Pub-
lic for the within county and state, this 27th day of 
March, 1948, Joseph L. Livingston, who, being first 
duly sworn, duly acknowledged to me that he sub-
scribed the within and foregoing instrument. 
"(Seal) 
"Is/ Fleda Hafen 
"Notary Public residing at Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
"My Commission Expires: 
"My Commission Expires Jan. 28, 1949." 
This assignment was delivered by the assignor person-
ally, leaving it at the home of one of the assignees in the 
presence of all three of them (R. 53, 54, 55). Pursuant to 
the direction of the assignor (R. 56) the assignment was 
taken by the assignees to the Wasatch Chemical Plant where 
the notary acknowledged the execution of it (R. 56). It 
thereafter remained at the home of one of the assignees 
and her husband, Lester Cook, except while it was in the 
recorder's office or temporarily loaned to the appellant ad-
ministrator (R. 54-7). 
At the time of execution and delivery of the assignment 
and several years prior thereto the assignor operated an 
extensive livestock enterprise in western Colorado (R. 50-
68). It was stipulated that his estate was appraised for in-
heritance tax purposes in the sum of $902,913.37 (R. 91). 
Lorin DeW ayne Merriam, the maker of the note, trust deed 
and chattel mortgage, was the nephew of the assignor (R. 
68) . He had been assisting the assignor for several years 
in the latter's livestock operations (R. 68-9). It is apparent 
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that the note and mortgages represent the balance of the 
purchase price of the mortgaged property sold by the de-
ceased assignor to DeWayne. DeWayne's brother Dick had 
also been employed by the deceased for a number of years (R. 
51). Mrs. Merriam, one of the assignees, was the mother of 
De Wayne and Dick (R. 50). She had been a widow for 
about ten years and supported herself since the death of her 
husband by working in a restaurant and doing home nursing 
( R. 69) . She was the assignee of a 50% interest in the note 
and mortgages assigned (Exhibit A). She suffered a stroke 
and at the time of the trial was partially paralyzed (R. 45). 
Mrs. Robertson, one of the assignees, was a widow 
and in failing health at the time the assignment was made. 
She died about a year and a half later (R. 46). 
Mrs. Cook, the last-named assignee, was the wife of 
Lester Cook and lived next door to the deceased (R. 45-6). 
Her son Glade had also for a number of years assisted the 
assignor in his livestock operations (R. 51). 
The deceased was survived by his widow and three 
daughters, two of whom were married (R. 75-6). He was 
64 years old (R. 82) and in failing health (R. 82). 
Mr. A. H. Anderson, who witnessed the assignment, had 
been associated with the deceased for a number of years 
in the sheep business (R. 60). He was appointed manager 
of the estate of the deceased by the administrator (R. 40). 
On November 1, Mr. Anderson endorsed on the note (Ex-
hibit D) a payment of $5,476.92 and also a notation that 
interest was paid to date. Mr. Cook testified that he re-
ceived from Mr. Anderson a total of about $8,000.00 but 
TH: 
JN1 
NO' 
v~ 
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that all except $2,500.00 was returned to DeW ayne Mer-
riam ( R. 84-87) . This money was given to Cook by Ander-
son at the direction of De Wayne (R. 84). 
It was stipulated that the administrator of the estate 
of the deceased in his inheritance tax report listed the note 
as a gift made by the decedent in contemplation of death 
(R. 90-1) . The note, the trust deed and a certified copy 
of the chattel mortgage were found among the decedent's 
papers. They were taken by the administrator to the office 
of his attorney and thereupon delivered to the husband of 
one of the assignees (R. 35-38). 
POINT I 
THE RESERVATION BY THE DONOR OF AN 
INTEREST IN T'HE PROMISSORY NOTE DID 
NOT RENDER THE GIFT OF THE NOTE IN-
VALID. 
The case turns upon the meaning and effect to be given 
to the clause in the assignment wherein the assignor re-
served to himself an interest in the promissory note. 
The provisions of the assignment other than the reser-
vation clause clearly manifest the intention of the assignor 
to transfer in praesenti all of his right, title and interest 
in the trust deed, the chattel mortgage and the promissory 
note secured thereby. He uses the words "hereby give and 
assign" which are apt words to accomplish an immediate 
transfer of all of the assignor's title and ownership in the 
note and mortgages. That the assignor intended this trans-
fer of title and ownership in the note and mortgages to take 
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effect as a gift is conclusiv~ly established by his use in the 
assignment of the word "give" and the words "in consid-
eration of the love and affection which I hold for the as-
signees herein." 
That the provisions of the assignment other than the 
reservation clause operate as an immediate transfer of all 
of the assignor's title and ownership in the promissory note 
and the mortgages securing its payment and establish 
conclusively the intention of the assignor that the transfer 
of such title and ownership should take effect as a gift 
is clearly established by several decisions of this court. 
See: 
Reed v. Knudsen, 80 Utah 428, 15 P. (2d) 346; 
Woolley v. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094; 
Boyle v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136; 
Olsen v. Scott, 61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987; 
Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. (2d) 235; 
Greener v. Greener, ... Utah ... , 212 P. (2d) 
194; 
Jones v. Cook, . . Utah ... , 223 P. (2d) 423. 
The question to be determined is whether this transfer 
by the assignor of all of his right, title and interest in the 
note and mortgages with the intention to effect an im-
mediate gift thereof is qualified or revoked by the reserva-
tion clause. 
Appellants apparently concede that the reservation 
clause does not impair or affect the gift of the interest 
provided for in the promissory note. Such an admission is 
fatal to appellant's entire case. It is fatal because it is an 
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admission that respondents' title to the note and mortgages 
vested in them immediately on delivery of the assignment. 
Such a concession is well advised. The reservation clause 
reads: 
"* * * provided, however, that the under-
signed assignor hereby reserves unto himself during 
his lifetime all amounts becoming due on the princi-
pal of said promissory note and all amounts in excess 
of the amounts periodically becoming due thereon 
which the maker thereof under the terms of said 
note may choose to pay on said principal during the 
lifetime of the assignor herein ; * * * '' 
There is not a word in this clause that purports to qualify 
in any manner or respect the assignor's previously expressed 
intention that the transfer of title and ownership should 
take effect immediately as a gift. There is no expression 
of any intent to postpone the transfer to some future per-
iod. All that the reservation clause purports to do is to 
reserve to the assignor some interest in the note. The res-
ervation of an interest in the note did not defer the effec-
tive date of the transfer to the assignees. It merely cut 
down or took back part of the assignor's entire title and 
ownership which by other provisions of the assignment 
had been vested in the assignees. The interest in the note 
which the assignor reserved was limited to a life estate. 
It ceased upon his death. The remaining estate in the prom-
issory note vested not upon the expiration of this life es-
tate but immediately upon delivery of the assignment. It 
is now well settled that the reservation of a life estate to 
the donor in the subject matter of the gift does not impair 
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or affect the validity of a gift of the remainder. In Boyle 
v. Dinsdale, supra, this court said: 
"A careful reading of the evidence has convinced 
us that it was the manifest purpose and intention 
of the deceased to place the money in question in a 
special deposit for the use and benefit of the two re-
spondents. That what she did and said at the time 
the deposit was made constituted a gift of the money 
to the two children named and a delivery thereof to 
the bank as trustee to be held by it for their use and 
benefit during the life of the mother, with the right 
on her part of having the use and benefit of the ac-
cruing interest until her death, after which the 
money was to be paid to them. The transaction in 
law, therefore, constituted a gift in praesenti of the 
principal, with the right of the donor to draw the 
accruing interest during life, and thus the full pos-
session and enjoyment of the donees of the subject-
matter of the gift was postponed until after the 
death of the donor. Such a gift is not invalid upon 
the ground that it is a testamentary disposition. See 
cases above cited, and also see Wilson v. Carrico, 
140 Ind. 533, 40 N. E. 50, 49 Am. St. Rep. 213, where 
the principle is discussed and applied." 
In Candee v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 81 Conn. 372, 
71 A. 555, the donor had a savings deposit in the bank. 
She lost her passbook. She gave the donee an order upon 
the bank to pay the savings account to the donee but de-
clared at the time of delivery of this order that the account 
was "subject to her use of the same during her lifetime:' 
The court held that this reservation did not postpone the 
vesting of title to the savings account until the death of 
the donor. We quote from the opinion : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"Upon the facts found, independently of the ex-
pression, 'use of the same for her lifetime,' an inten-
tion to make an absolute gift is clearly shown. This 
expression does not make the gift conditional or un-
certain, but simply postpones the day of enjoyment. 
She intended that the fund should at once become 
the property of the plaintiff, and there was no at-
tempt to make the gift effectual after death. The 
elementary definition of the 'use' of money is the 
benefit or profit to be derived therefrom. Taking 
this whole expression together with the circumstances 
under which it was used, the only intelligent con-
struction to be given to it is that the words 'use of 
the same for her lifetime' simply included the in-
come or profit of the money in the bank. A reserva-
tion by the donor of certain proprietary rights in the 
subject of the gift, such as the use and enjoyment 
thereof, is not necessarily inconsistent with the ab-
solute character of the gift, and gifts accompanied 
by such reservations have been repeatedly upheld." 
Other cases wherein it is held that a transfer of title 
to personal property with donative intent is a valid gift 
even though there are reservations of a life interest in the 
transferor or conditions subsequent. 
Gordon v. Barr, 13 Cal. (2d) 596, 91 P. (2d) 101; 
Beech v. Holland, 172 Oregon 396, 142 P. 2nd 
990; 
Collins v. McCanless, 169 S. W. (2d) 850; 179 
Tenn. 656; 
Edson v. Lucas, 40 F. (2d) 398; 
Eaton v. Blood, 201 Iowa 834, 208 N. W. 508; 
Bea.tty v. Western College of Toledo, 177 Ill. 280, 
52N.E.432; 
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Northern Trust Company v. Swarrtz, 141 N. E. 
433, 309 Ill. 586 ; 
Parker v. Mott, 181 N.C. 435, 107 S. E. 500; 
Dinslage v. Stra.tman, 105 Neb. 274, 180 N. W. 
81. 
The reservation by a donor of a life interest in the 
subject of the gift not only does not indicate any intention 
to postpone the vesting of title in the donee but indicates 
exactly the opposite. It indicates the intention of the donor 
to vest immediately in the donee the remainder of the title. 
As pointed out by this court in Allen v. AUen, . . . Utah 
... , 204 P. (2d) 458, where the grantor in a quitclaim deed 
reserved a life estate in the property; "the retention of a 
life estate in the property covered by the deed raises a 
presumption that the deed is to operate immediately as a 
conveyance since retention of the part is indicative of an 
intention to divest herself of the balance presently and adds 
strength to the presumption of delivery arising from the 
record." 
Appellants break down the subject matter of the gift 
into two parts ; one, the principal provided for in the prom-
issory note and the other the interest due on the principal, 
and then proceed to argue that the assignor reserved do-
minion and control over the principal. It is immaterial how 
the subject matter of the gift is broken up so long as it is 
recognized as appellants do that the rights in the subject 
matter of the gift reserved by the assignor expired upon 
his death. 
]ti; 
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What the assignor reserved to himself was ( 1 ) the 
right to receive any payments made voluntarily by the 
maker on the principal of the note during the lifetime of 
the assignor, and (2) the right during his lifetime to re-
ceive the amounts becoming due on the principal of the 
note. Nothing was paid voluntarily by the maker on the 
principal during the lifetime of the assignor and hence no 
interest in any voluntary payments survived to the appel-
lants. The right which he reserved to receive the amounts 
becoming due on the principal expired upon the death of 
the assignor. There was, therefore, no right, title, claim 
or interest in the promissory note or the mortgages that 
would survive the death of the assignor. 
It is to be noted that the maker of the note covenanted 
to pay annually on the "obligation" of the note the net 
profits derived from the operation of the mortgaged sheep. 
It is clear that the assignor intended by the reservation 
clause to retain for himself during his lifetime the right 
to these net profits. It is, therefore, more accurate to de-
fine the rights reserved by the assignor as attaching to 
funds to be created by the maker of the note rather than 
to the principal of the note. But regardless of what the 
right reserved attached to it was a right that ceased to 
exist upon the assignor's death. 
It is significant that the assignor did not reserve any 
interest in or right to the trust deed or the chattel mort-
gage securing the payment of the note. Had he intended 
to reserve anything more than a life estate in the net profits 
of the operation of the sheep and the payments which the 
maker of the note might voluntarily pay during the life-
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time of the assignor, he undoubtedly would have reserved 
some rights in the mortgages securing the payment of the 
note. He reserved no rights in the mortgages because the 
right which he reserved in the note needed no security. We 
recognize that the securities follow the note, but the ab-
solute transfer of the securities without reservation of 
any rights therein make positive and clear that the assignor :;::Jr 
intended by the reservation clause to retain simply the : :~ 
right to certain payments that might be made by the maker j1 
of the note in the lifetime of the assignor. 
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
assignment corroborate the express intention of the as-
signor to reserve to himself only a qualified and limited in-
terest in the note. The gift of all o:f the note and the se-
curity was not in any sense an unnatural disposition of the 
donor's property. He was fond of his sisters and had con-
tributed to their support prior to the assignment. Two of 
the donees were widows and one of them at least was with-
out any means of support. While the value of the gift is 
substantial, it was not large in comparison with the amount 
of the property owned by the donor. The sons of the donees 
had assisted the donor in his sheep operations for many 
years. The donor was 64 years old and in failing health. 
There is no suggestion in the record that he was importuned 
by anyone to make the gift. Undoubtedly the donor con-
sidered this gift not as an act of generosity but as the ful-
fillment of a moral obligation. It was by no means either 
an impulsive or ill considered donation. 
The authorities relied upon by appellants do not con-
trovert the proposition that a conveyance of the title to 
·ir 
!We 
:~.I 
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personal property intended by the assignor to take effect 
immediately as a gift is not invalidated by a reservation of 
an interest in the property or by a postponement of the 
full use and enjoyment of the property. The controlling 
inquiry is the intention of the donor, and each case stands 
on its own facts. Where the donor has expressed his in-
tention in a writing that is not ambiguous, there is no issue 
of fact concerning the donor's intention. It is a matter 
of law to be decided by the court. 
POINT II 
DELIVERY OF THE ASSIGNMENT WAS CON-
STRUCTIVE DELIVERY OF THE NOTE AND 
MORTGAGES AND COMPLETED THE GIFT. 
We recognize that some form of delivery is essential 
to the validity of a gift inter vivos of personal property. 
There has been considerable discussion by the courts as 
to the character and form of delivery that is necessary in 
cases such as this one wherein the donor has manifested in 
clear and unequivocal language his intention to make a 
gift. In Gordon v. Barr, supra, it is said: 
"The necessity for delivery in gifts of personal 
property has its genesis in the archaic doctrine of 
seisin. Brown on Personal Property, p. 7~; 20 Col. 
L. R. 19'6; 21 Ill. L. R. 341. But in spite of the ob-
solete and formalistic character of its origin, the 
requirement has salutary features which fully jus-
tify its retention in the law. It protects the prop-
erty of the individual from ill-founded and fraudu-
lent claims of gift by requiring strong concrete evi-
dence that he really intended to part with his prop-
erty. Such a precaution is especially desirable when, 
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as is frequently the case, the alleged donor is dead at 
the time the claim is asserted. Moreover, by requir-
ing some positive act of relinquishment such as man-
ual tradition of the subject of the gift, the signifi-
cance of the donor's act is forcefully brought home 
to him, and he is thus protected from ill-considered 
or impulsive donations of his property. See Mechem, 
The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels, 
21 Ill. L. Rev. 341, 457, 568, at 348 et seq. 
"In the light of these desiderata such vague 
terms as 'constructive delivery', 'symbolic delivery', 
and 'parting with dominion and controY take on a 
new aspect and become more certain and explain-
able. Where there has been unequivocal proof of a 
deliberate and well-considered donative intent on 
the part of the donor, many courts have been inclined 
to overlook the technical requirements and to hold 
that a 'constructive' or 'symbolic' delivery is suffi-
cient to vest title in the· donee. However, where this 
is allow~d the evidence must clearly show an inten-
tion to part presently with some substantial attri-
bute of ownership." 
In Greener v. Greener, this court said: 
"The most widely accepted view is that the 
property passes as a gift inter vivos, provided there 
is a donative intent and delivery. Christensen v. 
Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638. Recog-
nition that actual manual delivery of a chose in ac-
tion is impossible has led to a determination that 
relinquishment of control of the bank passbook is a 
legally sufficient symbolic delivery. And even where 
the donor retained the bank book it has been held 
that the delivery was sufficient, on the theory that 
the parties have an equal right to the book and de-
livery to either of the co-depositors is delivery to 
both. Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P. 2d 715. 
When this theory of delivery is adopted there is no 
~1re \1'! 
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substantial difference between the operative facts 
necessary for a gift inter vivos and for a third party 
beneficiary contract, the validity of the transfer in 
each case hinging on intent." 
The subject matter of the gift in the case before us 
is a chose in action evidenced by a promissory note, trust 
deed and chattel mortgage. The assignment was a convey-
ance of this chose in action and it discloses the intention 
of the donor that the conveyance was to take effect as a 
gift. The property transferred was incapable of a manual 
delivery. The delivery of the written assignment completed 
the transfer of title and fully effected the gift. The case 
of Reed v. Knudsen, supra, forecloses any question that the 
delivery of the assignment completed the gift. In that case 
the donor executed an assignment of a one-half interest in 
an estate of which he was the sole heir. The estate consisted 
of real and personal property. The assignment was with-
out consideration and therefore could operate only as a gift. 
There was no pretense of a delivery of any part of the 
assets of the estate, the subject of the gift. This court up-
held the gift after concluding that the assignment had been 
delivered to the donor's attorney with directions to deliver 
it to the donee. 
In Burkett v. Doty, 167 P. 518, 176 Cal. 89, the facts 
were these: The donor executed, acknowledged and deliv-
ered to the donee an assignment of a promissory note and 
mortgage securing its payment. The note was payable to 
the donor who was also the mortgagee. The assignment 
recited that it was not to be placed as of record during the 
lifetime of the donor. The note and the mortgage remained 
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in the possession of the donor in a box kept by her in the 
vault of a bank. The assignment was without considera-
tion. The Supreme Court held that the delivery of the 
assignment completed the gift of the note· and mortgage. 
The court said : 
"The assignment itself purported to transfer 
the notes immediately to the plaintiff. As it was 
duly signed, acknowledged, and delivered to the plain-
tiff, it constituted the strongest of evidence of the 
intention of the assignor to transfer the notes to 
the plaintiff in the manner there specified. And as 
the effect of that assignment, according to its terms, 
was to immediately transfer to the plaintiff the title 
and ownership of the notes, it constituted satisfac-
tory, if not conclusive, evidence of the intent of the 
assignor to do that which the instrument, in law, 
would accomplish; that is, to divest herself of all 
right of dominion over the notes, and of all present 
right to, or control over them, and to make an im-
mediate transfer of the title thereto. It must be re-
membered that, as between donor and donee, it is not 
necessary to the validity of a gift inter vivos, if 
made by a written instrument transferring the title 
to the donee, that the possession of the thing given 
be passed to the donee. The transfer of the right 
to its immediate possession and control, the title 
thereto, is sufficient, and the gift then takes effect, 
although the donor retains all the power of control 
that can arise from such possession. Driscoll v. Dris-
coll, supra; Francoeur v. Beatty, supra. 
"The provision declaring that 'this assignment 
of said mortgage is not to be placed as of record dur-
ing the lifetime' of the assignor does not purport to 
operate upon the notes which, of course, were not 
entitled to record, as such. It does not purport to 
operate upon the title to either the mortgage or the 
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notes, nor in any way to change. the. legal effect of 
the instrument as a conveyance thereof. The trans-
fer of both was complete· without such record." 
That the delivery of an assignment transferring the title 
to personal property will effectuate a gift of it even though 
the subject of the gift is capable of manual delivery and 
remains in the possession of the donor is established by the 
following cases : 
In re Fenton's Estate, 165 N. W. 463, 182 Iowa 
346; 
Humphry v. Ogden, 125 P. 110, 5a Col. 309·; 
Sponogle v. Sponogle, 151 P. 43, 86 Wash. 649; 
Garrison v. Spencer, 160 P. 49'3, 58 Old. 442; 
Lipson v. Evans, 105 A. 312, 133 Md. 370; 
Fontron v. Korzuskieuwz, 266 P. 649, 125· Kan. 
725; 
Sylvain v. Page, 276 P. 16, 84 Mont. 424. 
None of the cases cited by appellants support the prop-
osition that either the endorsement or actual delivery of 
the promissory note is indispensable to the validity of the 
gift of the note. In none of the cases in which appellant 
refers was there a delivery of a formal assignment of the 
subject of the gift. As has been pointed out, the basis of 
the law requiring delivery to effectuate the gift is that it 
is concrete evidence of the intention to make a gift. Here 
we have a formal instrument solemnly executed by the donor 
in which he manifests in unequivocal language his inten-
tion to make a gift. He uses the word "give", the primary 
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meaning of which is to transfer gratuitously. See Baker 
V. Pyeatt, 108 Ind. 61, 9 N. E. 112. He uses the words "in 
consideration of the love and affection" which removes any 
possible question that he intended the word "give" to have 
its usual and primary meaning. The donor also uses the 
word "assign", the primary meaning of which is to transfer 
title or ownership of property. It is the most appropriate 
word to effect a transfer of a chose in action. See Com-
mercial Discount Company v. Cowan, ... Gal. ... , 116 P. 
(2d) 599. The delivery of the assignment is far more con-
clusive of the intention of Livingston to make a gift of the 
note than is a mere handing over to the assignee the evi-
dence of the indebtedness which is the real subject matter 
of the gift. To hold in this case that manual tradition of 
the note is essential would amount to a total disregard of 
the basis of the law requiring delivery and would overrule 
the prior decisions of this court. 
Appellants refer to and cite Section 61-1-31 of the Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Act which provides that an 
instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one 
person to another in such manner as to constitute the trans-
feree the holder thereof and if the instrument is payable 
to order it is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder 
completed by delivery. They say that this section of the 
Negotiable Instruments Act has some bearing upon the re-
spondents' ownership of the note and mortgages. 
Section 61-1-31 might have some application if this 
were an action against the payee or his estate, ba·sed upon 
an alleged endorsement of the note by the payee. No such 
controversy is here presented. This is a simple contest be-
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tween the payee and his assignees concerning the title and 
ownership of the note. Appellants assert that the payee 
has not parted with his title or ownership in the note. The 
respondents assert that he did. They base their title upon 
the assignment which by its words of conveyance transfer 
to them all the payee's title to the note. They maintain that 
the transfer of that title was made as a gift and that the 
delivery of the assignment was in law a delivery of the note. 
That Section 61-1-31 can give no comfort or aid to 
the appellants is established by Johnson v. Beickey, et al., 
64 Utah 43, 228 P. 189. The facts in that case were these: 
The defendant was the payee of a promissory note which 
he endorsed and delivered to the bank as collateral security 
for a loan. Later he executed and delivered to Machen an 
assignment of the promissory note. The note, however, was 
never endorsed or delivered to Machen but remained in the 
possession of the bank. Subsequent to the execution and 
delivery of the assignment, the plaintiff obtained a judg-
ment against the defendant and garnished the note in the 
hands of the bank. A short time later the bank loan was 
paid off and the controversy in the action was between the 
plaintiff and the assignee l'I.Iachen. Plaintiff claimed that 
the assignment to Machen and the delivery of the assign-
ment to Machen was ineffectual to transfer the title to the 
note because there was no endorsement or delivery of the 
note to Machen. This court held that neither endorsement 
nor delivery of the note was at all essential to the passing 
of title to the note and that the delivery of the assignment 
vested in the assignee the title and ownership of the note. 
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The plaintiff relied particularly upon what is now Section 
61-1-31 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The court said: 
"* * * While the Negotiable Instruments 
Law expressly provides that every contract on a 
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable 
until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of 
giving effect thereto, such provision is merely a leg-
islative enactment of the common-law rule, and was 
not intended to abrogate or impair other well-recog-
nized rules by which delivery would be implied, either 
from authority actually conferred by the maker or 
holder upon an agent, or from conduct which should 
estop them from claiming that they had not delivered 
or authorized the delivery of the instrument. The 
trial court made no finding as to whether or not the 
note·was endorsed to the banking company, nor was 
such finding necessary. The transfer to the bank is 
not in question, and it may be assumed that the in-
strument was so endorsed. It might thereafter be 
transferred without endorsement, by delivery merely. 
Such delivery may be actual, or constructive, such 
as written evidence of the transfer intending thereby 
to vest the thing itself in praesenti in the assignee, 
but it is not essential that the delivery shall be di-
rectly to the assignee. Stoll v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. 
Co., 115 Wis. 558, 92 N. W. 277. 
"Turning to the authorities cited by appellant, 
we find that they do not change or modify the gen-
eral rules with reference to the transfer or negotia-
tion of negotiable instruments. 
" ' "Assignment" of bills and notes is often 
referred to as including endorsement, but as 
used herein the term is confined to a transfer 
without endorsement. Like an ordinary chose 
in action, a bill or note may be transferred by 
assignment or by mere delivery with the usual 
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incidents of such a transfer, and this rule is not 
changed by the negotiable instrument law. 
* * * It may be formal or informal ; * * * 
it may be by a separa.te instrument, or in the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary, by pa~ol.' 
(Italics ours.) 8 Cyc. p. 383. 
"And in the case of O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 
Wash. 493, 93 Pac. 1078, the court held: 
" 'No doubt a promissory note may be trans-
ferred without endorsement, the same as any 
other article of personal property, either under 
our statute or independent of statute.' 
"'Assignment' and 'endorsement,' as applied to 
negotiable instruments, are not synonymous terms. 
An endorsement is not merely a transfer of title, but 
a new and substantive contract by which the en-
dorse-r becomes a party to the instrument and liable, 
on certain conditions, for its payment. An assign-
ment means a transfer of the title. It neither in-
cludes nor implies becoming in any way a party to 
the payment, or responsible for the insolvency or 
default of the maker." 
POINT III 
ANY ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL 
·COURT IN PERMITTING ISABELLE MER-
RIAM TO BE A WITNESS AND TESTIFY IN 
THIS CASE WAS HARMLESS. 
Without question Isabelle Merriam was competent to 
testify to any material matter with the possible exception 
of the delivery of the assignment by the deceased and state-
ments made by him at the time of such delivery. For the 
purpose of this case it may be conceded that her testimony 
with respect to the delivery of the assignment by the de-
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ceased and statements made by him at that time was er-
roneously received. However, the delivery of the assign-
ment and the statements made by the deceased at the time 
were testified to by the witness Cook who was to no extent 
disqualified from testifying to such matters. Mower v. 
Mower, 64 U. 260, 228 P. 911; Olson v. Scott, 61 U. 42, 
210 P. 987; Burnham v. Tschler, ... U .... , 208 P. (2d) 
96; Gene v. Harper, ... U .... , 222 P. (2d) 571. There 
was no conflict in the evidence whatever on the issue of 
delivery of the assignment. On the contrary the only evi-
dence produced by the appellants touching the issue of de-
livery was in corroboration of the respondents' evidence. 
The appellants do not upon this appeal question the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support the finding of the court 
that the assignment was delivered by the deceased to the 
assignees. The case was tried by the court without a jury. 
It is presumed that the trial court disregarded any incom-
petent testimony admitted. Such being the state of the 
record, any error committed by the trial court in permitting 
Mrs. Merriam to testify was harmless and could have no 
effect upon the outcome of the trial. See Baird v. Upper 
Irrig. Co., 70. U. 57, 257 P. 1060; Cook v. Jones, U . 
. . . , 206 P. (2d) 630; Olson v. Scott, supra. 
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SUMMARY 
In conclusion the respondents submit that the assign-
ment (Exhibit A) assigned and transferred to respondents 
all of the assignor's right, title and interest in the promis-
sory note and the mortgages securing its payment; that the 
assignor's intention that such transfer of ownership should 
operate as a gift is established beyond a reasonable doubt; 
that the assignor reserved to himself only the right during 
his lifetime to receive certain payments that might be made 
by the maker of the note; that the reservation of such right 
or limited interest in the note did not defer or postpone 
the gift to respondents; that the delivery of the assignment 
operated as a constructive delivery of the note and mort-
gages and the failure of the donor to endorse the note or 
manually deliver it to the donees did not impair or affect 
the validity of the gift; that no prejudicial error was com-
mitted by the trial court in ruling upon the testimony of 
Mrs. Merriam; and that the judgment appealed from is 
right and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Q. VAN COTT, 
GRANT H. BAGLEY, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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